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Excessive subprime residential mortgage lending  
has plunged the United States into one of the worst recessions  
in a century.  Although the underlying causes were many, 
securitization played a large role as demand for securities backed 
by subprime loans enabled subprime lending markets to flourish.  
This Note argues that regulation of the Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises1 (“GSEs”)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—is still 
insufficient to prevent another crisis.  It proposes changes to the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 20082 (“HERA”) intended 
to ensure the GSEs’ future safety. 
The GSEs were the single largest enablers of the subprime 
crisis.  They purchased and issued vast quantities of residential 
mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) backed by subprime loans, 
while enabling the deterioration of underwriting standards.  
They strove to fulfill two contradictory goals: fulfilling the 
affordable housing goals set by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”), while simultaneously producing a 
healthy return for shareholders.  They benefited from a widely 
held belief that the GSEs’ securities are guaranteed by the 
federal government.  This unique situation—privatization of 
profits and socialization of risk—created a moral hazard that led 
GSE executives to take excessive risks. 
 
† St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John’s University School of 
Law; M.M., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004; B.M., Stetson University, 2001. 
1 The term “government-sponsored enterprise” means a corporate entity created 
by a law of the United States that has a federal charter, is privately owned, is under 
the direction of a board of directors, a majority of which is elected by private owners, 
and is a financial institution with the power to make loans or loan guarantees for 
limited purposes and to raise funds by borrowing. See 2 U.S.C. § 622(8) (2006). It 
does not exercise powers reserved to the government, may not commit the 
government financially, and is able to pay its own expenses. Id. 
2 Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2850 (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.)  
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The legislative and executive branches were unable to stop 
the GSEs.  Using affordable housing as a potent political weapon, 
the GSEs successfully lobbied to protect their unique 
congressional charters from effective regulatory oversight.  
Eventually, however, as the crisis unfolded and loans entered 
into default, the GSEs sought protection from the federal 
government and are now under the conservatorship of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”). 
Recognizing the GSEs’ role in the crisis, Congress passed 
HERA, which altered the GSEs’ regulatory regime in significant 
ways.  HERA created the FHFA.  FHFA is a strong, independent 
regulatory agency with broad powers to set the GSEs’ capital 
levels, approve new loan programs, and restrict lobbying activity.  
HERA also imposed a broad affordable housing mandate on the 
GSEs, requiring them to support affordable loan programs, and 
gave FHFA complete discretion over the program’s scope. 
HERA, however, has several defects.  Aside from a general 
requirement that the GSEs operate safely, the Act does not 
sufficiently constrict the FHFA’s discretion in setting affordable 
housing goals.  Moreover, the Act does nothing to curtail the 
GSEs’ enormous lobbying power. 
This Note proposes various amendments to HERA designed 
to prevent a repeat of the subprime crisis.  First, HERA should 
be amended to prevent the GSEs from lobbying the executive or 
legislative branches of government.  This will likely have the 
effect of increasing government control over the GSEs.  And 
because the FHFA has already suspended the GSEs’ lobbying 
activity, this is not a new suggestion, but one that has already 
resulted in substantial positive effects. 
Second, the Act should require the GSEs to focus on the core 
mortgage market, making affordable housing just a small part of 
their overall business.  The GSEs should be prohibited from 
purchasing private label RMBS, undoubtedly the most toxic 
assets.  The federal government should offer an explicit 
guarantee on mortgages backed by prime loans.  Finally, there 
should be a definite cap on the number of affordable housing 
loans the GSEs can purchase.  These changes will likely have the 
effect of stabilizing the secondary mortgage market, and of 
neutralizing the GSEs’ moral hazard by restricting their ability 
to abuse affordable housing programs for political and financial 
gain.  Any consequential reduction in the availability of 
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affordable loans can be addressed through other federal 
programs. 
II. PROBLEMS AND NEED FOR CHANGE 
This Part discusses how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
among the primary causes of the subprime crisis.  After a brief 
background discussion describing the key players in the 
mortgage markets and data about the subprime crisis, the 
Section explores the nexus between the RMBS market and 
subprime loans and argues that investor demand for RMBS 
provoked much subprime lending.  The Part shows how the GSEs 
stimulated the secondary market by abandoning conservative 
underwriting standards and investing in subprime securities.  In 
the fallout of their 2003 and 2004 accounting scandals, the GSEs 
acted with the intent to protect their unique congressional 
charters.  By using their dominant market position to shape the 
subprime market with their affordable housing programs, they 
fostered the illusion of prosperity in many congressional districts 
by increasing the rate of homeownership, but did so in exchange 
for support from congressmen and women and the President. 
A. Background 
1. The Key Players 
To place this discussion in its proper context, some general 
background information about how the GSEs impact the 
residential mortgage market is necessary. 
For the better part of a century, the residential mortgage 
market has been shaped and standardized by federal sponsorship 
of mortgages.3  Beginning with Depression-era legislation, 
Congress created entities that gave the federal government 
enormous influence over the residential mortgage market and 
greatly increased its complexity: the GSEs, known as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.4 
 
3 See, e.g., Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)) (providing money for slum-clearance projects and 
construction of public housing, increasing the role of mortgage insurance, and 
providing assistance to rural homeowners). 
4 See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2185, 2195–97 (2007). 
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In 1938, Congress created the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae”).5  Fannie Mae’s function was to 
purchase the Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA’s”) 
“nonconventional” insured loans and provide a quick source of 
capital to mortgage lenders.6  This new secondary market gave 
many mortgage loan companies, insurance companies, and even 
commercial banks the confidence they needed to get back into the 
consumer home loan business after the Depression.7 
In 1968, Congress privatized Fannie Mae and in 1970, 
created its counterpart, Freddie Mac, and gave them each a new 
mission: purchasing private non-government insured loans.8  
Congress’s goal was to “provide liquidity, stability and 
affordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.”9  
Relying on the “three Cs” of traditional underwriting—collateral, 
capacity, and credit reputation—both Fannie and Freddie 
purchased “conforming” loans meeting fairly stringent 
underwriting criteria.10  Although many of these criteria were 
later abandoned, for many years the GSEs set the gold standard 
of mortgage underwriting.11 
Originally, Fannie and Freddie simply held mortgages 
themselves,12 but the nature of their business changed 
dramatically with the advent of securitization.13  In the early 
1970s, the GSEs began creating or insuring mortgage-backed 
securities.14  These were relatively simple instruments that 
merely “passed through” interest and principal to investors on a 
pro-rata basis.15  The GSEs would purchase residential 
mortgages, assemble them into homogenous pools, and sell rights 
in the pool to institutional investors.16  Under this arrangement, 
 
5 See National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1252 (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006)); see also Peterson, supra note 4, at 2196. 
6 Peterson, supra note 4, at 2196 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
7 See id. 
8 See id. at 2198. 
9 Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page= 
home&c=aboutus (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1716. 
10 See David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory 
Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 716–17 (2009). 
11 See id. at 717.  
12 See Peterson, supra note 4, at 2196. 
13 See id. at 2198–99. 
14 See id. 
15 Id. at 2198 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 See id. at 2198–99. 
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investors could participate in a large and geographically 
diversified number of mortgages, lessening the significance of 
any one default.17  And, because the pool was homogenous, 
investors could calculate default and refinancing risks more 
easily.  “Securitization of mortgage loans by the GSEs allowed 
the larger capital markets to directly invest in American home 
ownership at a lower cost than the older depository lending 
model of business.”18  For the first time, global capital markets 
were directly linked to residential mortgages. 
Fannie and Freddie have since grown to immense 
proportions.  As of December 31, 2009, Freddie’s total mortgage 
portfolio, including mortgage-related investments and the unpaid 
principal balance of all other loans and securities that it 
guaranteed, was $2.3 trillion.19  Similarly, as of September 30, 
2009, Fannie held or guaranteed $3.2 trillion in mortgage debt.20  
The total U.S. residential mortgage debt outstanding, which 
includes single-family and multifamily loans, was approximately 
$11.8 trillion as of December 31, 2009.21  In other words, Fannie 
and Freddie directly or indirectly bear the risk for forty-seven 
percent of the total outstanding U.S. residential mortgage debt.  
Because of losses on more than $1 trillion of subprime and Alt-A 
investments22—almost all of which were added to their single 
family book of business between 2005 and 2007—Fannie and 
Freddie have been under conservatorship by the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency since September 2008.23 
2. The Subprime Market 
Although lenders typically form their own precise 
definitions, a subprime loan is simply one that carries “a 
premium above the prevailing prime market rate that a borrower 
 
17 See id. at 2199. 
18 Id. 
19 See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 
24, 2010) [hereinafter Freddie Mac 2009 10-K Report]. 
20 See id. at 2. 
21 See id. at 3. 
22 See Schmudde, supra note 11, at 718–21. Alternative-A loans (“Alt-A”) are 
those with a risk profile greater than prime loans but less than subprime loans.  
23 See About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index? 
page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); Frequently Asked Questions 
About Freddie Mac, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/faqs/#8 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
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must pay.”24  The loan typically results not only in higher interest 
rates, but pre-payment penalties, higher closing fees, and other 
costs.25  “Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit 
histories that include payment delinquencies, and possibly more 
severe problems such as charge-offs, judgments, and 
bankruptcies.”26 
Several key pieces of federal legislation made subprime 
lending possible.  During the 1980s, Congress preempted state 
laws on interest rate caps,27 permitted the use of loans with 
variable interest rates and balloon payments,28 and allowed 
interest deductions for mortgage debt, making it cheaper than 
consumer debt.29  Congress also enacted legislation benefitting 
the secondary market.  By modifying the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and preempting state blue sky and legal investment laws, 
Congress permitted state-chartered and regulated financial 
 
24 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the 
Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 36 (2006), 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross 
.pdf. 
25 See id. at 32.  
26 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., EXPANDED GUIDANCE 
FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/Boarddocs/SRletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf. Much of what complicates empirical 
research into this area is a lack of precise definitions of “subprime.” Subprime 
borrowers tend to exhibit one or more of the following characteristics:  
(1) Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more 
60-day delinquencies in the last 24 months; 
(2) Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 
months;  
(3) Bankruptcy in the last 5 years; 
(4) Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit 
bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the 
product/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an 
equivalent default probability likelihood; and/or 
(5) Debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater, or otherwise 
limited ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly 
debt-service requirements from monthly income. 
Id. at 3. 
27 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in various sections of 
12 U.S.C.). The Act preempted laws governing the rates of any mortgage loan, 
whether for purchase or refinance. See id. Since many subprime loans are 
refinancing loans, this was a very significant feature of the Act. 
28 See Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 
96 Stat. 1545 (codified as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–805 
(2006)). 
29 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified at 
26 U.S.C. §§ 47, 1042 (2006)). 
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institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, trustees, and 
other regulated entities to purchase “mortgage related 
securities.”30  Congress also amended the Tax Code in 1986 to 
create Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (“REMICs”) to 
facilitate securitization of residential mortgages.31   
Because of the legal changes described above, new loan 
products came to the market.  They offered borrowers greater 
flexibility, but also posed a danger that uninformed consumers 
would select a loan product irresponsibly.  New products included 
interest-only loans, adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”), option 
mortgages, and even loans combining various characteristics of 
each.32  Often, they were available to consumers with less than 
full documentation of their income and assets.33  These 
innovations, combined with a large amount of capital on the 
secondary market, led to an explosion of mortgage lending:  
Between 2000 and 2008, the amount of outstanding single-family 
mortgages of all kinds rose from $5.1 trillion to over $11 trillion.34   
Although it is generally agreed that the subprime market 
was an enormous part of the overall market, there appears to be 
a shortage of “consistent information available about the size of 
the subprime market.”35  “[T]here are deficiencies in all available 
single-family mortgage market data series, whether collected by 
federal agencies, private firms, or trade associations.  That is not 
surprising, as data collection efforts were designed to address 
specific areas of interest, and data collection is expensive and 
 
30 See Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C. and 
15 U.S.C.). 
31 Though beyond the scope of this paper, much could be said about other 
securitization structures, which become complex financial instruments that may 
have obscured the true risks faced by investors by purporting to shield them from a 
borrower’s default. The GSEs were among the leading innovators of residential 
mortgage-backed securities. See The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 
Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government 
Reform, 110th Cong. 139–40 (2008) [hereinafter Pinto] (statement of Edward J. 
Pinto, former Chief Credit Officer, Fannie Mae), available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090116_kd4.pdf.  
32 See Schmudde, supra note 10, at 715–16. 
33 See Pinto, supra note 31, at 161. 
34 The Present Condition and Future Status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Financial Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 146 (2009) 
[hereinafter Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing] (statement of James B. Lockhart 
III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency). 
35 Pinto, supra note 31, at 139. 
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seldom done for ‘pure’ research.”36  Also, subprime and Alt-A 
loans appear in both subprime and prime databases belonging to 
the GSEs.37  In other words, because many conforming subprime 
loans purchased by the GSEs were classified as prime, “there are 
many more subprime and Alt-A mortgages outstanding today 
than many people suppose.”38  
For example, according to one estimate, the total amount of 
subprime originations increased from $65 billion to $332 billion 
between 1995 and 2003.39  According to another estimate, the 
number of subprime originations increased from 962,000 to 3.2 
million between 1998 and 2006.40  According to yet another 
estimate, between 2001 and 2006, subprime originations 
increased from $190 billion to $600 billion.41  Still another:  The 
“number of subprime originations increased more than five-fold 
from 2000 through 2005—rising from approximately 457,000 to 
about 2.3 million—before declining somewhat in 2006 and falling 
off sharply in 2007.”42 
Despite considerable variations in the data, it is impossible 
to deny that nonprime originations increased dramatically in the 
first half of this decade.  High levels of global economic growth 
made capital available to the secondary markets.43  And a tight 
 
36 FORREST PAFENBERG, OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT, 
SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGES ORIGINATED AND OUTSTANDING: 1990–2004, at 4 
(2005), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1151/mortmarket1990to2004.pdf. 
37 See Pinto, supra note 31. 
38 Id. at 140. 
39 See Chomsisengphet, supra note 24, at 37 (citing data from the trade 
magazine Inside B & E Lending).  
40 See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME LENDING: A NET DRAIN 
ON HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 (2007) (citing data from a proprietary database, Inside 
Mortgage Finance, and SMR Research Corporation), available at http://www. 
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Net-Drain-in-Home-
Ownership.pdf.  
41 Current Trends in Foreclosures and What More Can Be Done To Prevent 
Them: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement 
of William B. Shear, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment; 
Government Accountability Office), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/? 
a=Files.Serve&File_id=42eb8117-74c5-4378-a7e8-9505d858d78d. 
42 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R, CHARACTERISTICS AND 
PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 6 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d09848r.pdf. 
43 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 2008, at 19 (2008) [hereinafter JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD UNIV. 2008], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications 
/markets/son2008/son2008.pdf. 
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housing market drove home prices to new levels.44  Both of these 
factors combined to create a thriving RMBS market, and the 
GSEs were major drivers of this expansion. 
Although detailed data about securitization is also plagued 
with problems, it appears that the total volume of loans 
securitized increased with the volume of origination.  More 
specifically, the secondary market’s appetite for securities backed 
by subprime loans increased in the first half of the decade.  
Between 1995 and 2003, the securitization rate of subprime loans 
rose from 28.4% to 58.7%.45 
Given that securitization increased with lending, the 
inference to be drawn is that one event caused the other.46  As Dr. 
Alan Greenspan observed:  “The evidence strongly suggests that 
without the excess demand from securitizers, subprime mortgage 
originations (undeniably the original source of crisis) would have 
been far smaller and defaults accordingly far fewer.”47   
As the housing market imploded in 2007, the demand for 
subprime loans from both consumers and investors dried up.  
Between 2006 and 2007, subprime originations decreased from 
over $139 billion to less than $14 billion.48  Loan performance 
deteriorated as the foreclosure rate for subprime loans rose from 
4.5% in the fourth quarter of 2006 to 8.7% a year later.49   
At the height of the crisis, the state of the nation’s housing 
was bleak. Delinquency and foreclosure rates skyrocketed; both 
 
44 Id. 
45 Chomsisengphet, supra note 24, at 38. 
46 Dr. Greenspan summarizes how mortgage lenders were simply meeting the 
demand of investors:  
The big demand was not so much on the part of the borrowers as it was on 
the part of the suppliers who were giving loans which really most people 
couldn’t afford. We created something which was unsustainable. And it 
eventually broke. If it weren’t for securitization, the subprime-loan market 
would have been very significantly less than it is in size.  
Jon Meacham & Daniel Gross, The Oracle Reveals All, NEWSWEEK, Sep. 24, 2007, at 
32, 34. 
47 The Financial Crisis and the Role of the Federal Regulators: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) 
[hereinafter Financial Crisis Hearing] (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former 
Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). 
48 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV. 2008, supra note 43, at 
19. 
49 Id. at 20. 
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reached historic highs in 2008–2009.50  As introductory rates 
expired and consumers suffered from a global economic 
slowdown, foreclosure became a nation-wide problem of epic 
proportions.  For much of this decade, the highest foreclosure 
rates existed in the economically distressed states of Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois.51  But in 2008, four other states 
that had over indulged in risky loan products saw large increases 
in foreclosures.52  Foreclosure rates in California, Arizona, 
Nevada, and Florida rose from less than 0.9% at the start of 2007 
to 5.9% by the end of 2008.53  In the last quarter of 2008, the 
number of foreclosed loans climbed above “660,000 in these four 
states alone, accounting for . . . 61 percent of the growth in 
foreclosures nationwide.”54   
In conclusion, this Section identified the key players in the 
mortgage market, and explained how an increasingly liberal 
legal environment led to a sharp increase in subprime lending 
and subsequent securitization during the first half of the decade.  
Critical to this expansion was the causal nexus between the 
secondary market and the consumer market, making the GSEs 
major enablers of the ensuing crisis.  The next Section will 
illustrate how the GSEs were key players in causing this market 
explosion.    
 
50 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.& URBAN DEV., U.S. HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS: 2ND 
QUARTER 4 (2009), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/ushmc/ 
winter09/USHMC_Q409.pdf. 
The delinquency rate on all mortgage loans in the first quarter of 2009 (the 
data are reported with a lag) was at its highest level since the series began 
in 1972, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association.  The foreclosure 
start rate on all mortgages also set a record high after remaining steady 
since the second quarter of 2008.  The delinquency rate for all mortgage 
loans was 9.12 percent in the first quarter of 2009, up from 7.88 percent in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 and up from 6.35 percent in the first quarter of 
2008.  The delinquency rate for subprime mortgage loans was 24.95 percent 
in the first quarter of 2009, up from 21.88 percent in the fourth quarter of 
2008 and up from 18.79 percent in the first quarter of 2008. 
Id. 
51 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 2009, at 20 (2009) [hereinafter JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
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B. The “Ownership Society”:  GSEs as Instruments of National 
Policy and Political Gain 
In understanding the secondary market’s role in subprime 
lending, one must understand how the GSEs were used as 
instruments both of federal policy and private gain.  Because of 
the enormous volume of securities issued each year, the GSEs 
are the most significant players in the RMBS field.  Due to their 
implicit governmental guarantees and historically conservative 
underwriting standards, investors tend to perform minimal due 
diligence on GSE securities.  But unless the GSEs are reformed, 
marketplace discipline alone will not protect homeowners, 
taxpayers, or investors from abuses of the GSEs’ enormous power 
to shape the entire marketplace.   
The story begins with the GSEs’ unique congressional 
charters.  Although the GSEs are publicly traded firms, they 
share many attributes of public institutions.  For example, each 
has an obligation to support affordable housing, a large line of 
credit with the treasury, five board members that the President 
of the United States can appoint, and, most importantly, debt 
that can be used to collateralize government deposits in private 
banks.55  This last characteristic has contributed to the 
perception that GSEs are government instrumentalities, and 
thus would not be allowed to fail.  In other words, the common 
understanding was that their profits were privatized while their 
financial risks were socialized.56 
The GSEs are thus inherently conflicted.  Because of their 
implicit governmental backing, they were not discouraged from 
taking excessive financial risks.57  But they were obligated to 
produce profits for shareholders.  And unlike other government-
firms that were immune to market discipline, the GSEs were not 
closely regulated.   
 
55 See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452 (West 2009) (establishing the corporate 
powers of Freddie Mac); Peter J. Wallison & Charles W. Calomiris, The Last 
Trillion-Dollar Commitment: The Destruction of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FIN. 
SERVICES OUTLOOK, Sept. 2008, at 3, 5, available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/ 
28704 (explaining that the GSEs appear to have a “tacit understanding” with 
Congress whereby the government will give them security if they concentrate on 
providing affordable housing). 
56 See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 5. 
57 For example, their leverage could, by statute, exceed 100 to 1. See Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 147 (statement of James B. Lockhart 
III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency). 
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The first clear threat to their power came after the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s (the “S&L Crisis”), which 
caused Congress to add an affordable housing mandate to their 
charters and created a full-time regulator called the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.58  
Despite efforts to regulate them, the GSEs successfully 
protected their charter powers by increasing influence in 
Congress.  Indeed, especially after the S&L Crisis, the GSEs 
faced a “political risk” that Congress would alter their charters.59  
But as Franklin Raines, ex-chairman of Fannie Mae once told his 
investors, “we manage our political risk with the same intensity 
that we manage our credit and interest rate risks.”60   
Their method was as simple as it was effective: money.  
Together, Fannie and Freddie contributed $14.6 million to 
various congressional campaigns between 2000 and 2008.61  The 
GSEs were “double-givers,” supporting members of both parties, 
especially those sitting on committees with jurisdiction over their 
industry.62  
And when they could not buy allegiance, they instead bought 
influence.  Between 2000 and 2008, both GSEs spent a combined 
$165 million lobbying Congress.63  The GSEs used this influence 
to swiftly crush all proposals that might decrease their 
profitability.  During his thirty years in Congress as a former 
member and chair of the House Financial Services Committee, 
Jim Leach experienced the GSEs’ power first-hand:  “When, for 
instance, I once introduced a battery of constraining 
amendments, including a doubling of capital requirements, to 
legislation favorable to Fannie and Freddie, it took each less than 
 
58 See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 2. 
59 See Niles Steven Campbell, Fannie Mae Officials Try To Assuage Worried 
Investors, REAL EST. FIN. TODAY, May 10, 1999, at 1, 20. 
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61 See COMMON CAUSE, ASK YOURSELF WHY . . . THEY DIDN’T SEE THIS COMING 
7–8 (2008), available at http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIw 
G&b=4542875.  
62 Id. at 8. 
63 See id. at 7–8. GSE contributions are not always above board. “In 2006, the 
Federal Elections Commission fined Freddie Mac $3.8 million for violations of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) when it held 70 campaign fundraisers—
raising about $1.7 million—mostly for members of the House Financial Services 
Committee.” Id. at 8. 
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48 hours to orchestrate both parties’ leadership to weigh in 
against trimming their wings of privilege.”64  
Their methods worked.  Until their collapse in 2007, the 
GSEs were both profitable, distributing billions in dividends each 
year.65  
Somewhat ironically, the most serious threat to the GSEs’ 
power and credibility was mostly of their own making.  Both 
experienced multi-billion dollar accounting scandals.  “In 2003, 
Freddie Mac understated billions in profits . . . .  In 2004, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission ruled that Fannie Mae had 
overstated profits by an estimated $9 billion.”66  
As a consequence of the public’s response to the accounting 
scandals, the GSEs faced a political risk that Congress would 
find the will to alter their charters and lessen their 
independence.  They therefore neede to use their immense 
financial power to win the necessary political support and protect 
their charters.  They turned to Affordable Housing.  
Affordable housing programs translated into real political 
benefits for congressmen and the President.  President George 
W. Bush promoted the Ownership Society as an ideal model of 
society, and home ownership was a central tenet.67  And when the 
GSEs focused their affordable housing programs in a 
Congressman’s or woman’s district, he or she could return to his 
or her district claiming credit for the apparent economic 
prosperity.  These reverse kickbacks allowed the GSEs to win 
allies in Congress.68   
No other organization had the power to shape the market 
like the GSEs.  From 1997 through 2003, the GSEs’ market share 
of all residential mortgage originations gradually grew to almost 
fifty-five percent.69  They were exempt from state and local 
 
64 Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 152 CONG. REC. S5217, 
(daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. McCain) (discussing how the GSEs used 
their lobbying power to avoid regulatory scrutiny prior to the accounting scandals of 
2003 and 2004). 
65 See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 5. 
66 COMMON CAUSE, supra note 61, at 7. 
67 See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: America’s Ownership Society: 
Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives 
.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html. 
68 See Pinto, supra note 31, at 142. 
69 James B. Lockhart III, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Speech Before the 
National Association of Real Estate Editors: The Roles of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
and the Federal Home Loan Banks in Stabilizing the Mortgage Market 1 (June 18, 
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taxes.70  And because they could borrow money more cheaply 
than other investors, they received a federal subsidy of an 
estimated $6.5 billion.71   
The President had, to some extent, the power to control the 
GSEs.  Since the early 1990s, Congress had given HUD the 
power to set affordable housing goals for the GSEs, requiring 
them to purchase a certain amount of “affordable” loans.72  
Although an affordable loan is not necessarily a subprime loan, 
the GSEs had allowed underwriting standards to deteriorate to 
compete with private label securities.  For example, in 1998, 
Fannie began buying ninety-seven percent loan-to value (“LTV”) 
mortgages, and in 2001, one-hundred percent LTV mortgages.73  
After the scandals of 2003 and 2004, Fannie and Freddie were in 
a perfect position to ramp up their affordable lending programs.   
In response to policies of both the Clinton and Bush 
administration’s desires to increase the level of home ownership, 
HUD imposed aggressive affordable housing goals.  Between 
2000 and 2007, HUD increased the GSEs’ affordable housing 
goals from forty-two percent to fifty-five percent.74  Acting in the 
name of affordable housing, the GSEs began purchasing 
subprime loans in earnest in 2005.  Fannie and Freddie both 
reported that “mortgages with subprime characteristics 
comprised substantial percentages of all 2005–2007 mortgages 
 
2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2919/Lockhart percent20Speech 
percent20to percent20National percent20Association percent20of percent20Real 
percent20Estate percent20Editors-06-18-09.pdf. 
70 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(e) (West 2009) (exempting Freddie Mac from federal, 
state, and local income taxes); Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the 
Crisis; Subprime Loans Labeled ‘Affordable,’ WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A1. 
71 Leonnig, supra note 70.  
72 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. 102-550, § 1333, 106 Stat. 3672, 3958 (1992). The Act allowed HUD to set 
affordable housing goals for the GSEs, essentially requiring them to purchase 
certain amounts of “affordable” loans. Id. Not all affordable loans are subprime, 
however. 
73 See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 6. It should be noted here that the 
GSEs were only prohibited by statute from buying loans above a certain amount. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2) (2006); id. § 1717(b). They were never required to buy loans 
conforming to any particular credit quality. See 12 U.S.C.. § 1454(a)(1); 
12 U.S.C.A. § 1719(a)(1) (West 2010). However, to purchase loans with a LTV ratio 
greater than eighty percent, due to restrictions in their charters, they had to rely on 
external credit enhancement. See 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2); id. § 1717(b)(5)(C). 
74 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OVERVIEW OF THE GSES’ HOUSING 
GOAL PERFORMANCE, 2000–2007, at 4 tbl.1 (2008) [hereinafter OVERVIEW], available 
at http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/GSE/gse2007.pdf. 
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the compan[ies] acquired.”75  They bought no-documentation 
loans, interest-only loans, negative amortization ARMs, loans 
with LTVs exceeding ninety percent, loans with FICO scores 
below 620, and Alt-A loans.76  In 2006, for example, nearly thirty 
percent of certain affordable loans purchased by the GSEs had a 
LTV ratio of ninety-five percent or greater.77  And they bought 
them in great quantities.  In 2005, the GSEs financed 7.4 million 
units of housing through their affordable housing programs, and 
6.6 million in 2006.78  As of 2008, Fannie and Freddie held or 
guaranteed just over $1 trillion in subprime debt. 79   
Fannie and Freddie also enabled other major players in the 
financial world to become involved in the subprime market.  In 
2004, GSE executives made it known to the mortgage industry 
that they would aggressively pursue subprime lending, thereby 
encouraging originators to focus on such loans.80  Former Fannie 
Mae Chairman and CEO Franklin Raines declared to “a packed 
house” at the Mortgage Bankers Association’s 2004 Annual 
Convention, “We have to push products and opportunities to 
people who have lesser credit quality.”81  At the same conference, 
Richard Syron, former CEO of Freddie Mac, noted that Freddie’s 
philosophy had changed, and only a small group of leaders would 
determine the amount of risk the company was willing to take.82  
Syron also noted that he would encourage lenders to make loans 
“with lower down payments and credit scores.”83   
Raines and Syron delivered on their promises.  The GSEs 
became the largest purchasers of private-label subprime 
securities (“PLS”), investing more than $400 billion in subprime-
backed securities.84  Overall, banks issued PLS in greater 
 
75 Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 7. 
76 Id. 
77 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PROFILES OF GSE MORTGAGE 
PURCHASES IN 2005–2007, at 30 tbl.7d-2006 (2008), available at http://www.huduser. 
org/portal/datasets/GSE/profiles_05-07.pdf. 
78 Id. at 14 tbl.4-2005, 15 tbl.4-2006.  
79 See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 1. Between 2005 and 2007, 
“[r]oughly 33 percent of the companies’ business involved buying or guaranteeing 
these risky mortgages, compared with 14 percent in 2005.” Zachary A. Goldfarb, 
Affordable-Housing Goals Scaled Back, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2008, at A11. 
80 See Pinto, supra note 31, at 149.  
81 Neil J. Morse, Looking for New Customers, MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1, 2004, 
at 109. 
82 See id.  
83 Id.  
84 See COMMON CAUSE, supra note 61, at 8. 
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quantities than the GSEs.85  But because HUD allowed these 
securities to count towards their subprime lending goals, the 
GSEs could purchase certain tranches from other financial 
institutions.86  This was favorable to the GSEs, who had 
experienced a decrease in their market share after the 2003 and 
2004 accounting scandals and because of an increase in PLS 
issuance.87  Between 2004 and 2006, Fannie and Freddie 
purchased $434 billion in subprime-backed securities, roughly 
twenty-five percent of all PLS issued by other financial 
institutions.88  Fannie and Freddie encouraged the growth of this 
market not only by purchasing the securities, but also by lending 
it an aura of credibility, thereby encouraging other institutional 
investors to participate.89   
Ultimately, these investments performed poorly and were 
disastrous for the GSEs.  As Freddie recently reported:  “At 
December 31, 2008 and 2007, our net unrealized losses on 
mortgage-related securities were $38.2 billion and $10.1 billion, 
respectively.”90   
Fannie and Freddie’s abuse of affordable housing programs 
caused the most damage in the communities most in need of their 
responsible administration.  “Poor neighborhoods and often 
African-American and Latino neighborhoods have seen the 
highest incidence of subprime loans and housing foreclosures.”91  
Lower-income and minority home buyers were defaulting at a 
rate at least three times higher than other borrowers.92  The 
industry was rife with sharp practices that made matters worse.  
 
85 See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 146 (statement of 
James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency) (“Issuance of 
private-label subprime securities surged beginning in 2004, when 46 percent of all 
single-family mortgage-backed security issued were PLS. The PLS share peaked at 
56 percent in 2006, but fell to 4 percent in 2008.”). 
86 See id. at 147 (“To maintain profitability of the retained portfolios and to meet 
HUD-designated affordable housing goals, each Enterprise increased purchases of 
PLS backed by alternative mortgages and of high-risk whole loans.”). 
87 See id. at 146–47. 
88 See JAMES LARDNER, BEYOND THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN: ADDRESSING THE 
CURRENT CRISIS, AVOIDING A FUTURE CATASTROPHE 10 (2008), available at 
http://www.demos.org/pubs/housingpaper_6_24_08.pdf; Kathleen Day, Villains in the 
Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going., WASH. POST, June 1, 2008, at B1.  
89 See LARDNER, supra note 88, at 10.  
90 Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Mar. 11, 
2009). 
91 COMMON CAUSE, supra note 61, at 3. 
92 See Leonnig, supra note 70, at A1. 
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For example, by the end of the subprime bubble, more than half 
of all subprime loans were going to people with credit scores that 
could have qualified them for traditional mortgages.93   
Fannie and Freddie took a leading role in the subprime crisis 
that crippled the global economy.  “What happens to mortgage 
credit now rests in the hands of the federal government.”94  As 
Congress formulates new policy and legislation to deal with the 
subprime lending crisis, it must look to the future.  It cannot 
overlook the GSEs’ role in subprime lending.   
III. CURRENT GOVERNING LAW AND CRITIQUE 
This Part provides a summary and a critique of the legal 
status quo governing the GSEs.  Section A discusses the most 
fundamental piece of legislation affecting the GSEs: their unique 
congressional charters.  Then, it describes Congress’s latest 
efforts at regulating the GSEs with the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008.95  Section B discusses the authority of the 
regulator for the GSEs: the FHFA. 
Section C critiques the current regime.  Current law can be 
described as Congress’s attempt to balance at least two 
competing and sometimes opposed concerns.  One concern is 
ensuring the financial safety of the GSEs by requiring safe 
financial practices.  The other is an attempt to effectuate the 
longstanding federal policy of attaining high levels of home 
ownership by using the GSEs to increase homeownership among 
low-income borrowers.  The Section argues that, although the 
GSEs should retain much of their unique public/private nature, 
the current law does too little to address the moral hazards 
inherent in that structure.  This hazard led to a primary cause of 
the subprime crisis: abuse of the GSEs affordable housing 
mission.  
First, the Part argues that the affordable housing mission is 
vaguely defined and subject to abuse.  Second, it contends that an 
essential part of controlling the GSEs’ behavior is limiting or 
 
93 See Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-
Worthy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1.  
94 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV. 2009, supra note 51, at 2. 
95 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 
2654. 
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curtailing their awesome lobbying power, which the current law 
fails to do.96   
A. The GSEs’ Core Legislation: The Charters  
Congress created the GSEs and outlined their key powers 
through unique corporate charters.97  The original charters have 
each been amended several times over the years, but the most 
comprehensive version of each charter has been codified to title 
12 of the United States Code.  Although not enacted into law, 
title 12 of the United States Code does incorporate all of 
Congress’s most recent amendments to the charters, as well as 
the most current law concerning the regulator: the FHFA.   
Fannie and Freddie’s charters are, in all essential respects, 
identical.  The charters grant the two GSEs virtually identical 
organizational structures, corporate powers to buy and sell 
mortgages, and corporate powers to issue securities.98  For 
convenience, this Section will refer to Freddie Mac’s charter, but 
will note the places where Fannie Mae’s charter differs in 
significant respects.  
1. Basic Purpose 
The purpose of the corporation is laid out in the beginning of 
Fannie Mae’s charter.99  There, Congress declared that the 
purpose of the Act was “to establish secondary market facilities 
for residential mortgages, [and] to provide that the operations 
thereof shall be financed by private capital to the maximum 
 
96 Pursuant to its broad powers as conservator, the FHFA stopped all of the 
GSEs’ lobbying after initiating the conservatorship. See Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 142 (statement of James B. Lockhart III, Director, 
Federal Housing Finance Agency). However, once the conservatorship ends, nothing 
in current law would prohibit them from resuming their lobbying or campaign 
contributions.  
97 Congress created Freddie Mac with the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 451 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1452 (West 2009)). Congress created the current version of Fannie Mae 
with the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1252 
(1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006)). 
98 For convenience, this section will refer to Freddie Mac’s charter, but will note 
the places where Fannie Mae’s charter differs in significant respects. 
99 12 U.S.C. § 1716. Freddie’s charter contains nearly identical language. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006). 
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extent feasible.”100  To that end, Congress required the GSEs to 
meet five goals.  They are to  
(1) provide stability in the secondary market for residential 
mortgages; (2) respond appropriately to the private capital 
market; (3) provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market 
for residential mortgages . . . by increasing the liquidity of 
mortgage investments and improving the distribution of 
investment capital available . . . [;] (4) promote access to 
mortgage credit throughout the Nation . . . by increasing the 
liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the 
distribution of investment capital available for residential 
mortgage financing; and (5) manage and liquidate federally 
owned mortgage portfolios in an orderly manner.101  
2. Basic Organization 
Freddie is a government-sponsored enterprise, created as “a 
body corporate under the direction of a Board of Directors.”102  
The board consists of thirteen directors, and has, at all times,  
at least 1 person from the homebuilding industry, at least 1 
person from the mortgage lending industry, at least 1 person 
from the real estate industry, and at least 1 person from an 
organization that has represented consumer or community 
interests for not less than 2 years or 1 person who has 
demonstrated a career commitment to the provision of housing 
for low-income households.103   
Board members serve for one-year terms and cannot receive 
compensation for their services if they are employees of the 
federal government.104   
Freddie has common stock, each share of which is entitled to 
one vote.105  Although Freddie cannot restrict the transferability 
of these shares, it can place “limitations on concentration of 
ownership” of common shares as it sees fit,106 presumably to 
ensure diffused ownership and prevent takeovers.  Freddie may 
 
100 12 U.S.C. § 1716. 
101 Id.  
102 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(a)(1) (West 2009).  
103 Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A). 
104 Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A), (D). 
105 See 12 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006). 
106 Id. § 1453(a). 
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also have preferred stock, the terms being set by the board of 
directors, but preferred shares have no voting rights.107   
The charter gives Freddie many ordinary corporate powers.  
For example, it enjoys perpetual succession until dissolved by an 
act of Congress, can make contracts and release claims, sue and 
be sued, and can determine its necessary expenses, including the 
salaries of its employees.108  However, “a significant portion of 
potential compensation of all executive officers . . . shall be based 
on the performance of the Corporation.”109   
The GSEs are headquartered in Washington, D.C., and are 
exempt from federal, state, and local taxes.110   
3. Secondary Market Activities 
The most important aspect of the charters enables the GSEs 
to operate in the secondary market with considerable flexibility, 
autonomy, and discretion.  The charter accomplishes this by 
authorizing Freddie to purchase certain mortgages and then to 
issue securities backed by those mortgages, as well as other 
kinds of debt instruments.   
Freddie is authorized “to purchase, and make commitments 
to purchase, residential mortgages.”111  The statute defines the 
term “residential mortgage” much more broadly than it is 
conventionally used.  For example, the term includes real 
property containing structures consisting of “one or more 
condominium units.”112  It also includes loans secured by mobile 
homes, loans used to renovate residential properties, refinance 
loans, and second lien loans.113  Freddie is not authorized to 
originate mortgages.   
 
107 See id. § 1455(f). Dividend payments on all common and preferred stock have 
been suspended during the conservatorship. FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, STRATEGIC 
PLAN 2009–2014, at 21 (2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/14476/ 
FHFA_StrategicPlan_2009-2014n.pdf. 
108 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(c). 
109 Id. § 1452(c)(9). Executive compensation is subject to some limitations. The 
GSEs must submit a report to Congress on “the comparability of the compensation 
policies of the Corporation with the compensation policies of other similar 
businesses.” Id. § 1452(h)(1)(A). Essentially, this provision guarantees that so long 
as GSE executives earn no more than executives at other extremely large financial 
firms, then Congress will not take issue with their compensation. 
110 Id. § 1452(a)(1), (e). 
111 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(1) (2006). 
112 Id. § 1451(h). 
113 See id. 
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The statute confines Freddie’s activities to residential 
mortgages, which “are deemed by” Freddie to “meet generally the 
purchase standards imposed by private institutional mortgage 
investors.”114  The statute authorizes Freddie to classify mortgage 
sellers based on various financial characteristics to “establish 
requirements, and impose charges or fees, which may be 
regarded as elements of pricing.”115  In other words, Freddie need 
not treat all sellers equally, nor must it make all programs 
available to all sellers, so long as its classifications and 
discriminations “bear a rational relationship to the purposes or 
provisions of [the statute].”116  This language is absent from 
Fannie’s charter.   
The statute imposes few restrictions on the kinds of 
mortgages Freddie can buy.  Freddie cannot buy a mortgage with 
a LTV ratio greater than eighty percent, unless one of three 
conditions is met.117  Two conditions apply to the seller.  The 
seller can retain at least ten percent of the mortgage, or the 
seller can agree to repurchase the mortgage in the event of 
default.118  In the alternative, Freddie can obtain a guarantee or 
insurance on the amount of principal in excess of eighty percent 
of the value of the collateral from “a qualified insurer as 
determined by the Corporation.”119  This provision is of enormous 
importance because it allows Freddie great flexibility in 
purchasing external credit enhancements such as credit 
derivative swaps.  This provision enabled the GSEs to purchase 
subprime loans.   
The statute’s most concrete limitations are on the size of 
loans that Freddie may purchase.120  The limitations apply to 
both first and second lien mortgages but allow some flexibility for 
high-priced markets, as well as for Alaska, Hawaii, and the 
Virgin Islands.121  Each year, the limitations are adjusted by 
 
114 Id. § 1454(a)(1). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. § 1454(a)(2). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (emphasis added). 
120 See id. (“Such limitations shall not exceed $417,000 for a mortgage secured 
by a single-family residence, $533,850 for a mortgage secured by a two family 
residence, $645,300 for a mortgage secured by a three family residence, and 
$801,950 for a mortgage secured by a four family residence.”). 
121 See id. 
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FHFA.122  Freddie is authorized to lend against the mortgages it 
holds, provided that “the lending activities shall be conducted on 
such terms as will reasonably prevent excessive use of the 
Corporation’s facilities.”123   
The statute also authorizes Freddie to sell mortgages with or 
without recourse.  Freddie may sell mortgages according to 
“terms and conditions relating to resale, repurchase, guaranty, 
substitution, replacement, or otherwise,” which Freddie 
prescribes.124   
Most importantly, Freddie may issue debt instruments and 
mortgage-backed securities.125  These securities are exempt from 
regulation under the securities laws.126  However, Freddie may 
not guarantee any RMBS unless it has first purchased the 
underlying mortgage.127  The statute requires Freddie to indicate 
that the securities “are not guaranteed by the United States and 
do not constitute a debt or obligation of the United States.”128  
However, the statute does provide that the securities “may be 
accepted as security for all fiduciary, trust, and public funds, the 
investment or deposits of which shall be under the authority and 
control of the United States or any officers thereof.”129  The 
statute gives the Secretary of the Treasury ordinary authority to 
purchase up to $2.25 billion worth of debt or securities from 
Freddie.130  The statute also requires the Secretary of the 
Treasury to approve any new loan programs.131   
4. Oversight and Reporting 
The charter itself imposes some obligations on Freddie that 
increase its transparency and that help Congress ascertain 
whether Freddie is fulfilling its mission.  The statute authorizes 
the Comptroller General to audit Freddie under “such rules and 
 
122 See id. 
123 See id. § 1454(a)(5). 
124 Id. § 1454(a)(3). 
125 See id. § 1455(a). 
126 Id. § 1455(g). 
127 Id. § 1455(h)(1). 
128 Id. § 1455(h)(2). This provision has done little to prevent the common 
perception that obligations and securities are, in reality, guaranteed by the United 
States. See Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored 
Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 583–85 (2005). 
129 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(g) (West 2009). 
130 See 12 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (2006). 
131 Id. § 1454(c). 
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regulations” as he or she may prescribe.132  The statute grants 
the Comptroller full access to Freddie’s books and records.133  It 
also requires a private audit annually.134  Freddie must also 
submit to the FHFA annual and quarterly reports on its financial 
condition.135   
The statute imposes a duty on Freddie to maintain extensive 
amounts of data relating to its one- to four-family home mortgage 
portfolios, including such information as “the income, census 
tract location, race, and gender of mortgagors,” the LTV ratio, 
and whether the mortgage is new or seasoned.136  Freddie must 
also prepare extensive reports for both the House and Senate on 
all of its activities.137  These reports must be disclosed to the 
public.138   
In sum, Fannie and Freddie exhibit many typical corporate 
characteristics.  They have perpetual succession, are governed by 
a board of thirteen directors, have both common and preferred 
stock, and possess the same legal capacity to contract and sue as 
any other corporation.  Their corporate powers are specific and 
are limited to purchasing and securitizing certain residential 
mortgages.  But they also enjoy special privileges, such as an 
exclusion from state, federal, and local taxes.  Interestingly, the 
GSEs’ commitment to affordable housing is not evident from 
their charters alone.  The charters provide only for an affordable 
housing advisory council to “advise the Corporation regarding 
possible methods for promoting affordable housing for low- and 
moderate-income families.”139  The true scope of the affordable 
housing mission only becomes apparent after a close analysis of 
the legislation that created and governs the FHFA.   
B. The Regulator 
Congress recently overhauled the GSEs’ regulatory scheme 
with the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008.140  The most significant change affecting the GSEs was the 
 
132 12 U.S.C.A. § 1456(b)(1) (West 2009). 
133 See id. § 1456(b)(2). 
134 See id. § 1456(d). 
135 Id. § 1456(c). 
136 Id. § 1456(e)(1). 
137 See id. § 1456(f). 
138 Id.  
139 Id. § 1456(g)(1). 
140 Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).  
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creation of the FHFA, an independent agency tasked with 
oversight of the GSEs and the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks 
(the “Banks”).  If the charters created any ambiguity about the 
GSEs’ duty to participate in affordable housing, the Act clarifies 
the intent of Congress.  The findings show that the GSEs “have 
an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable 
housing . . . in a manner consistent with their overall public 
purposes, while maintaining a strong financial condition and a 
reasonable economic return.”141  Congress also seems to 
recognize, however, that an affordable housing mission is 
susceptible to abuse, and found that “an entity regulating the 
[GSEs] should have sufficient autonomy from the enterprises and 
special interest groups.”142  To that end, Congress created a 
highly independent agency with considerable authority over the 
GSEs.   
1. The Agency and the Director 
FHFA is “an independent agency of the Federal 
Government,”143 with regulatory authority over the GSEs and the 
Banks.  Unlike the previous regulator, FHFA is not situated 
within any other executive department.  Rather, the agency is 
independent and is fully funded by the GSEs and the Banks, 
rather than by Congressional appropriations.144  Although HERA 
created a Federal Housing Finance Oversight Board, it has no 
real authority; it instead acts in a purely advisory role to FHFA’s 
director.145   
Virtually all of the agency’s power is vested in its director.  
The director is appointed for five year terms by the President, 
acting with the advice and consent of the Senate, and must “have 
a demonstrated understanding of financial management or 
oversight, and have a demonstrated understanding of capital 
markets, including the mortgage securities markets and housing 
finance.”146  In an effort to increase the director’s independence, 
 
141 12 U.S.C. § 4501(7) (2006). 
142 Id. § 4501(5). 
143 12 U.S.C.A. § 4511(a) (West 2009). 
144 See id. § 4516(a). The previous regulator was also funded by the GSEs. See 
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 211, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-288 (providing that the GSEs would fund the 
regulator). 
145 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4513a(a) (West 2009). 
146 Id. § 4512(b)(1), (2). 
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HERA provides that the director can only be removed by the 
President “for cause.”147  Previously, there were no restrictions on 
the President’s removal powers.148  The director may not have 
any financial interest in the GSEs, hold any position of office in a 
GSE, or have served as an executive officer or director of a GSE 
for three years prior to his or her appointment as director of the 
FHFA.149   
2. The Director’s Duties and Powers 
The director is given considerable power over the GSEs.  In 
the most general sense, the director must ensure that each GSE 
“operates in a safe and sound manner, including maintenance of 
adequate capital and internal controls.”150  The director must also 
ensure that the GSEs’ activities “foster liquid, efficient, 
competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets,”151 
and that the GSEs comply with applicable law.152  The director is 
authorized to review and “reject any acquisition or transfer of a 
controlling interest in a” GSE.153   
On a more specific level, the Act gives the director power 
over more particular aspects of the GSEs’ operation.  For 
example, the director has broad authority to establish standards 
relating to the adequacy of internal controls and information 
systems, management of interest rate and credit risks, 
management of asset growth, and even the size of investments 
and acquisitions of assets “to ensure that they are consistent 
with the purposes of this chapter and the authorizing 
statutes.”154   
Some of the director’s most important powers concern his or 
her ability to regulate the GSEs’ capital levels.  The director has 
the authority to establish “risk-based capital requirements for 
the enterprises to ensure that the enterprises operate in a safe 
and sound manner, maintaining sufficient capital and reserves to 
support the risks that arise in the operations and management of 
 
147 See id. § 4512(b)(2). 
148 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 
§ 1312, 106 Stat. 3672, 3945.  
149 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4512(g). 
150 Id. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(i). 
151 Id. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
152 See id. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(iii), (iv). 
153 Id. § 4513(a)(2)(A). 
154 Id. § 4513b(a). 
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the enterprises.”155  This represents a considerable increase in 
the director’s authority.  Previously, the director only had 
authority to apply a Risk Based Capital Test that determined the 
GSEs’ appropriate levels of capitalization.156  
In addition to the director’s discretionary power, the Act also 
imposes minimum capital levels.  The statute requires that the 
GSEs keep minimum capital levels equal to the sum of 2.5% of 
on-balance sheet assets, plus 0.45% of the unpaid principal 
balance of outstanding mortgage-backed securities, plus 0.45% of 
other off-balance sheet obligations.157  Thus, for every $100 worth 
of outstanding securities the GSEs issue or guarantee, they must 
keep 45¢ in cash on hand.  Of course, the director can impose 
higher capital levels, and the statute provides an extensive 
scheme of controls designed to ensure that the GSEs comply with 
such rules.158   
The director has the obligation to approve all new GSE 
products and programs.159  To gain approval, the products or 
programs must be both “consistent with the safety and soundness 
of the enterprise or the mortgage finance system” and in the 
“public interest.”160  The director must receive public comments 
on new products and programs according to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.161   
The Act imposes other duties on the director as well.  The 
director must require regular reports from the GSEs on their 
operations,162 as well as make regular reports to Congress 
concerning the GSEs’ housing goals.163  The Act imposes 
sanctions if a GSE misstates information in an annual or special 
report required to be made to the director.  The penalties 
imposed by the Act are $2,000 for negligent errors, $20,000 per 
day for each day a known negligent mistake is not corrected, and 
 
155 Id. § 4611(a)(1). 
156 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 
§ 1361(a), 106 Stat. 3672, 3941.  
157 12 U.S.C.A. § 4612(a). 
158 See, e.g., id. § 4615 (enumerating actions the director may take with respect 
to undercapitalized enterprises). 
159 See id. § 4541(a). 
160 Id. § 4541(b). 
161 See id. § 4541(c)(2). 
162 Id. § 4541(a)(1). 
163 Id. § 4544(a). 
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$1,000,000 per day for when the GSE acted “knowingly or with 
reckless disregard” for the accuracy of the report.164   
3. The Housing Goals 
The most important part of HERA gives the director of 
FHFA complete discretion in setting the GSEs’ housing goals.  
These regulations are promulgated in accordance with the  
informal rulemaking procedure of the Administrative Procedure 
Act,165 a procedure that gives the director considerable discretion.  
The Act requires the director to set housing goals for several 
categories of housing, including single- to four-family homes, 
multi-family housing, and low- and very low-income housing.166  
A GSE may petition the director to reduce these goals, but the 
director may only reduce the goals if the “market and economic 
conditions or the financial condition of the enterprise require 
such action” or if efforts to meet the goal “would result in the 
constraint of liquidity, over-investment in certain market 
segments, or other consequences contrary to the intent of this 
[Act].”167 
The Act imposes a duty to make loans in support of 
affordable housing.  The Act does not define “affordable housing” 
or “underserved markets.”  Rather, it contemplates housing goals 
in terms of the relative income of borrowers targeted by a 
particular program.  An “affordable loan” is, strictly speaking, 
simply one made to a borrower who earns at or below the median 
income for his or her area.168  The Act is silent about particular 
credit characteristics of borrowers.  Rather, it gives the GSEs 
considerable flexibility in engineering underwriting standards to 
meet housing goals.  The director is required to set goals for low- 
and very-low-income families, which are to be expressed as a 
percentage of total mortgages purchased by the GSEs.169  
 
164 Id. § 4514(c)(2). 
165 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2006). 
166 12 U.S.C.A. § 4562 (West 2009). 
167 Id. § 4564(b). 
168 A “moderate income” borrower earns less than the median income. See id. 
§ 4502(16). A “low-income” borrower earns less than eighty percent of the median 
income. See id. § 4502(14). A “very low-income” borrower earns less than fifty 
percent of the median income. See id. § 4502(24). And an “extremely low-income” 
borrower earns less than thirty percent of the median income. See id. § 4502(27). 
169 See id. § 4562. 
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In some instances, the Act specifically calls for “flexible” 
underwriting standards.  For example, to benefit markets for 
manufactured housing and certain projects subsidized under 
other federal programs, the Act requires the GSEs to “provide 
leadership to the market in developing loan products and flexible 
underwriting guidelines to facilitate a secondary market for 
mortgages for very low-, low-, and moderate-income families.”170 
The Act also requires the GSEs to engage with other 
organizations to further the federal policy of homeownership.  
The GSEs must “design programs and products that facilitate the 
use of assistance provided by the Federal Government and State 
and local governments.”171  They must also “develop relationships 
with nonprofit and for-profit organizations that develop and 
finance housing and with State and local governments, including 
housing finance agencies.”172  Also, they must take “affirmative 
steps to . . . assist primary lenders to make housing credit 
available in areas with concentrations of low-income and 
minority families.”173 
The director also has considerable power to require the GSEs 
to comply with these goals.  For example, once the director has 
determined that a GSE will not meet its housing goals, he or she 
may require that the GSE submit a housing plan detailing how 
the GSE intends to meet the goal.174  If the GSE does not comply 
with this order, the director may impose civil sanctions up to 
$50,000 for each day that the failure occurs.175   
The Act gives the director discretion in determining which 
loans count towards these goals, but this discretion is not 
unlimited.  For example, if the director finds that a particular 
mortgage was made on terms “contrary to good lending practices, 
inconsistent with safety and soundness, or unauthorized for 
purchase by the enterprises,” then it may not be counted towards 
satisfying the housing goals.176   
In sum, HERA created an independent agency with more 
power over the GSEs than at any other time in their history.  
 
170 Id. § 4565(a)(1). 
171 Id. § 4565(b)(1). 
172 Id. § 4565(b)(2). 
173 Id. § 4565(b)(3). 
174 This determination is made according to procedures laid out in 
12 U.S.C. § 4566. 
175 Id. § 4585(a)(4), (b)(2).  
176 Id. § 4562(i).  
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FHFA can control their capital levels, can determine which new 
products and programs make it to the market, and can exercise 
complete discretion over their affordable housing goals.  The 
director can require the GSEs to engage with certain 
underserved markets and has considerable discretion in 
determining if any goal has been met.  He or she can encourage 
the GSEs to develop “flexible underwriting guidelines” to ensure 
that the nation’s poorest individuals have access to loans.   
C. Critique of the Current Regime 
1. The Charter Should Remain Largely Unchanged 
The GSEs have, for the most part, accomplished the goals 
Congress gave them.  The United States has one of the most 
liquid and sophisticated markets for residential mortgages in the 
world.  For decades, global capital has had the opportunity to 
invest in domestic housing markets, and the GSEs have been 
among the most innovative creators of RMBS products.  Because 
the board has the ability to create preferred shares on their own 
terms, and because executive compensation is required to be 
determined with respect to performance, executives and 
shareholders have the potential to earn great wealth.  
Private ownership has, therefore, encouraged efficiency and 
innovation in the RMBS marketplace.  Because Fannie and 
Freddie compete with one another in identical markets using 
nearly identical powers and privileges, consumers are generally 
protected from abuses.  Indeed, the subprime crisis was not, in 
terms of underwriting standards, a race to the top.  Rather, it 
was a race to the bottom as each GSE tried to gain greater and 
greater shares of the growing subprime market.   
The considerable success of the GSEs in accomplishing their 
core mission illustrates that the recent crisis was a failure of 
execution, and not of form.  Unfortunately, the perceived GSE 
structure—privatization of profits and socialization of risk—
creates a moral hazard that may lead to excessive risk taking by 
management.   
Nowhere does this moral hazard become more apparent than 
when one considers the dilemma imposed upon management by 
the need to keep capital reserves.  Cash required to be on hand 
for capital reserves is not available for disbursement as a 
dividend.  As noted previously, the GSEs hold or guarantee over 
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$5 trillion in mortgage debt.  Given these enormous numbers, 
tiny adjustments in required capital reserves can have an 
enormous impact on the amount of money available for 
dividends.  Management has an incentive to keep capital levels 
as low as possible to maximize distributions to shareholders.  
And because the market perceives an implied governmental 
guarantee of all GSE products and debts, it will not necessarily 
incentivize management to maintain conservative capital levels.  
Voluntary efforts at safety will not work.  This risk is inherent to 
their structure and can only be countered by a strong regulator 
with clearly defined powers and duties.   
2. HERA’s Strengths and Shortcomings: a Powerful Regulator, 
a Vague Affordable Housing Mandate, and Unchecked 
Political Influence  
Never before have the GSEs been regulated so strongly.  The 
FHFA is considerably more independent than previous 
regulators because it is not under the control of HUD.  This is of 
critical importance because HUD—whose core mission is to 
encourage home ownership—was conflicted in its mission of 
regulating the largest enabler of mortgage markets in the world.  
It is, therefore, an improvement that FHFA’s director is both 
appointed and removed by the President and is not under the 
influence of any other executive department.   
Among HERA’s many strengths are the sweeping powers it 
gives the director of FHFA to ensure that the GSEs operate 
safely.  FHFA’s powers to regulate capital levels, control the size 
of mortgage portfolios, approve all new products, and have 
extensive access to all books and records are likely to prevent 
much risky behavior by GSE management.   
Despite these improvements, HERA suffers from 
considerable defects.  The affordable housing mission is vague.  
For example, aside from a broad command to ensure that the 
GSEs operate safely, there is no specific command addressing 
subprime loans.177  The Act requires the GSEs to purchase loans 
made to low-income borrowers, but it does not prohibit loans 
 
177 The closest the Act comes to speaking directly to subprime loans is in 
12 U.S.C. § 4601(a) (2006). This provision requires the GSEs to report to Congress 
on how underwriting standards impact the affordable housing mission. See id. Yet 
this provision has been in place since 1992 and did nothing to discourage excessive 
managerial risk taking and poor business practices.  
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made to borrowers with any particular credit characteristic.  Nor 
does the Act say how many subprime loans in the portfolio are 
“too many.”  It does not prohibit the GSEs from purchasing any 
particular type of private label RMBS.  In some instances, the 
Act requires the GSEs to develop “flexible underwriting 
guidelines” to further the affordable housing mission.178   
The Act also gives FHFA’s director complete discretion to set 
housing goals.  Indeed, under HERA there is no reason why the 
director of FHFA could not authorize an affordable housing 
program exactly like the ones adopted by the GSEs between 2005 
and 2007.  Not only does HERA not provide for judicial review of 
affordable housing goals, but, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, no federal court would review a decision that 
HERA commits to agency discretion by law.179  
HERA also does not address the GSEs’ ability to influence 
policy and legislation in Congress.  The GSEs accomplished this 
in two primary ways.  First, GSEs focus programs in particular 
districts to curry congressional favor.  To perform these so-called 
“reverse kickbacks” the GSEs make “affordable” loans more 
available in certain congressional districts than others, thereby 
fostering the perception of prosperity.180  Second, GSEs still can 
influence through lobbying and campaign contributions.  
The Act addresses neither reverse kickbacks nor lobbying or 
contributions.  Reverse kickbacks and lobbying have, for many 
years, made the GSEs somewhat independent from congressional 
or executive control.  But, as recent events have illustrated, the 
GSEs must remain securely under the thumb of their regulator 
and Congress.  The Act encourages reverse earmarking by 
requiring the GSEs to “develop relationships with nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations that develop and finance housing and 
with State and local governments, including housing finance 
agencies.”181  This provision could be applied selectively to certain 
districts in an attempt to curry favor with individual 
congressmen and women.   
In sum, HERA provides many badly needed reforms while 
failing in other critical areas.  Its positive changes include 
increasing the autonomy of FHFA and its director and giving the 
 
178 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4565(a)(1) (West 2009). 
179 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006). 
180 See Pinto, supra note 31, at 142. 
181 12 U.S.C.A. § 4565(b). 
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director wide discretion over various aspects of GSE policy and 
practice.  These reforms help counter the moral-hazard inherent 
to the GSEs unique public/private nature.  However, while the 
Act imposes an affordable housing mission, it fails to clearly 
describe how that mission is to be executed.  Although the Act 
broadly requires the director to ensure sound business practices, 
it does not specifically prohibit any risky practice.  In this sense, 
the director’s total discretion is a potential liability.  Nor does the 
Act constrain the GSEs’ proven ability to buy influence in 
Congress.   
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES 
This Part will propose two changes designed to avoid abuse 
of the GSEs’ affordable housing program.  First, the GSEs’ 
lobbying and campaign activities should be permanently 
eliminated.  Second, the GSEs’ affordable housing mission be 
clarified in three ways.  The federal government should offer an 
explicit guarantee on “core” securities.  Congress should amend 
HERA to prohibit GSEs from purchasing private label RMBS.  
Finally, HERA should be amended to place a cap on the amount 
of affordable mortgages that the GSEs can purchase, thereby 
limiting the director’s discretion in setting affordable housing 
goals.   
A. GSE Lobbying Should Be Curtailed 
The GSEs have a well documented history of abusing their 
lobbying power in Congress.  Some of this criticism comes 
directly from legislators themselves.182  Some criticism comes 
from academics,183 while other criticism comes from the press,184 
 
182 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5217 (2006) (statement of Sen. McCain) 
(discussing how the GSEs used their lobbying power to avoid regulatory scrutiny 
prior to the accounting scandals of 2003 and 2004); JAMES A. LEACH, FIXING FANNIE 
AND FREDDIE (2008), available at http://www.iop.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site 
/storage/fckeditor/file/Fannie%20and%20Freddie.pdf(noting that GSE lobbying 
resulted in “an eight-fold growth in mortgages owned by these two GSEs in less than 
two decades”). 
183 See, e.g., Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: Examining How the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails To Resolve the Foreclosure Crisis, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 561, 582 (2008) (criticizing HERA for allowing the GSEs to 
continue their lobbying activities).  
184 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Charles Duhigg, Loan Titans Paid McCain 
Adviser Nearly $2 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A16; Gretchen Morgenson, 
The Fannie and Freddie Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at BU1. 
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think tanks,185 and former executives.186  Indeed, even former 
FHFA director James Lockhart has recognized the lobbying 
temptations faced by GSE management, given the moral hazard 
in which they operate.187  Although HERA makes considerable 
changes to the overall regulatory structure, nothing in the Act 
controls the GSEs’ lobbying power.  Accordingly, the following 
changes should be made.   
First, the GSEs themselves should be prohibited from 
lobbying the executive or legislative branches of the Federal 
government.  Although it appears this change has not been 
proposed directly, it is implicit in all criticism of the GSEs.  This 
change will have the likely effect of helping to neutralize the 
moral hazard inherent in the GSE structure.  By eliminating 
excessive input to the executive and legislative branches of 
government, the GSEs can be regulated more objectively.  
Second, it is not enough to prohibit only the GSEs themselves 
from lobbying Congress or the FHFA.  The shareholders 
themselves should also be prohibited from lobbying.  This is 
especially true for large or preferred shareholders.  Finally, the 
GSEs should not be allowed to contribute to congressional or 
presidential campaigns.   
Indeed, this exact suggestion has already been tried.188  Since 
the initiation of the conservatorship, FHFA has stopped GSE 
lobbying activity on a temporary basis with positive results.  
Consequently, FHFA has made several significant changes that 
may not have been possible had the GSEs been able to lobby 
strongly.  For example, FHFA appointed new CEOs and boards of 
directors to both GSEs, while also developing a compensation 
structure designed to benefit productive employees while not 
rewarding poor performance.189  FHFA has also been able to focus 
 
185 See, e.g., Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 3–4 (describing the 
uncontrollable nature of GSE lobbying activity); Arnold Kling, Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae: An Exit Strategy for the Taxpayer, CATO BRIEFING PAPERS NO. 106, 4 
(2008), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/bp/bp106.pdf (describing how GSE 
lobbying prevented regulators from responding to risky behavior). 
186 Pinto, supra note 31, at 138, 142–43, 148. 
187 See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 151–53 
(statement of James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency). 
188 See id. at 142. 
189 See id. at 143.  
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the GSEs on foreclosure prevention programs.190  FHFA has also 
set new affordable housing goals.191   
Sanctions for violations of the restrictions should mirror the 
scheme set out in HERA for misstatements on the GSEs’ reports 
to Congress.192  The Act should impose a penalty of $1,000,000 for 
each intentional violation committed “knowingly or with reckless 
disregard” of the law, and $500,000 for each negligent violation of 
the law.   
In sum, Congress should amend HERA to require FHFA to 
prohibit all lobbying by the GSEs and by large shareholders.  The 
massive coercive power of the GSE lobbying machine is well 
documented by legislators, academics, think tanks, and the 
press.  GSE management, operating under a complex moral 
hazard, should not be tempted to repeat the mistakes of the past.  
The likely effects of this change would be to allow the GSEs’ 
regulator to ensure that they operate responsibly.  Indeed, much 
has already been proven; FHFA has already demonstrated the 
positive results that come from a prohibition on GSE lobbying. 
B. The GSEs’ Affordable Housing Mission Should Be Restricted  
As previously noted, HERA contains very few specifics 
regarding the GSEs’ affordable housing program.  In reality, the 
Act contains no concrete provision that prevents a repeat of the 
excessive acquisition of subprime mortgages and securities that 
took place between 2000 and 2007.193  Accordingly, this Section 
proposes an explicit governmental guarantee on core market 
securities, and limitations on the GSEs’ affordable housing goals.   
1. Explicit Government Guarantees of “Core Market” Securities 
The secondary market represents three distinct income 
streams.  One stream represents the “core market of routine 
products” associated with most borrowers.194  The second stream 
 
190 See id.  
191 See id. at 142; see also Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 585, 605 (2009) (noting that FHFA’s conservatorship 
seems to be stabilizing the GSEs). 
192 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4514(c) (West 2009). 
193 See Pinto, supra note 31, at 18 (“Fannie and Freddie will still be subject to 
the same unrealistically high affordable housing goals set by HUD (temporarily 
suspended) and now the responsibility of their safety and soundness regulator.”). 
194 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 88 (statement of 
Michael D. Berman, Vice Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Association). 
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represents government-backed mortgages associated with 
affordable housing finance.195  Finally, the third comes from 
mortgage markets “such as nonprime, jumbo, alt-A mortgages 
and other single-family and multifamily products.”196  
The GSEs’ charters should be amended to allow them to offer 
an explicit governmental guarantee on core securities.197  For 
example, securities backed by conforming prime loans could be 
explicitly guaranteed.  This change will likely ensure a stable 
real estate finance system.198  The core market is the most 
important, functioning as “a central nervous system for the 
entire real estate finance system.”199  “The core market was the 
last sector of the market to experience liquidity shortages in the 
recent downturn.  It is also likely that the [economy as a whole] 
will not recover completely until this sector is [stabilized].”200   
As a corollary to this change, the Secretary of the Treasury 
should state “loudly and at frequent intervals” that all noncore 
securities are not guaranteed by the federal government, and 
investors will have to bear all of thei risk associated with the 
investment.201  This will force the secondary market to accurately 
price securities backed by subprime loans.202  An implicit 
governmental guarantee distorts the secondary market by 
shifting risk from investors to the government.203   
 
195 See id. 
196 Id. 
197 See id.; see also Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage 
Market and the Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779, 805 (2008); MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOC., PRINCIPLES FOR 
ENSURING MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY 8 (2009), available at http://www.mbaa.org/ 
files/ResourceCenter/GSE/PrinciplesonEnsuringMortgageLiquidity.pdf.  
198 See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 88 (statement of 
Michael D. Berman, Vice Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Association). 
199 Id.  
200 Id.  
201 See Lawrence J. White, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing Finance: Why 
True Privatization Is Good Public Policy, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 528, Oct. 7, 
2004, at 16 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa528.pdf.  
202 See Financial Crisis Hearing, supra note 47, at 3 (statement of Dr. Alan 
Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve) (“It was the failure to properly 
price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis.”). 
203 See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOC., supra note 197.  
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2. Limitations on Affordable Housing Goals   
The GSEs’ affordable housing mission is poorly defined 
under HERA204 and still poses a risk of abuse.  Despite the risks, 
it is reasonable for the government to use the GSEs to pursue 
social and policy goals in exchange for its explicit guarantee.205  
Indeed, the GSEs have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for 
increasing the availability of mortgage credit to low-income 
borrowers.206  And underwriting standards do not necessarily 
have to be sacrificed to facilitate the financing of affordable 
housing.  But, as recent events illustrated, when achieving social 
goals takes priority over the GSEs’ financial safety, the entire 
real estate finance system comes under threat.  
Instead of prohibiting affordable housing finance, legislation 
should reach a compromise:  
The government should balance and coordinate any pursuit of 
social policy goals through the secondary mortgage market 
operations of [the GSEs] with their implications for safety and 
soundness, the efficient operation of the secondary mortgage 
market and their consistency with primary mortgage market 
and / or other requirements.  Such policy goals should be limited 
to residential housing in a way that does not contain market 
distortions.207   
Accordingly, the following changes should be made.  First, 
the GSEs should not be allowed to purchase private label 
mortgage backed securities as a means of satisfying affordable 
housing goals.208  This change will discourage the creation of 
 
204 See John Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in 
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of Dr. Susan M. Wachter, Professor of Financial Management, Real Estate, and 
Finance, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania) (noting that the 
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208 See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 182 (statement 
of Dr. Susan M. Wachter, Professor of Financial Management, Real Estate, and 
Finance, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania) (“The demand for 
securitized mortgages fed the demand for recklessly underwritten loans.”); id. at 140 
(statement of James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency) 
(“There is evidence that Enterprise efforts to meet previous housing goals, especially 
through the purchase of PLS, purchases of Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgages, and 
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private label RMBS backed by poorly-underwritten loans, and it 
will place the content of GSE portfolios under the direct control of 
FHFA.  However, this is admittedly a nonessential change, as 
subprime PLS are unlikely to find willing investors for some 
time.209   
Second, affordable housing goals must not take priority over 
the GSEs financial safety. Rather, “affordable housing goals 
should . . . promote sustainable mortgage options for low- and 
moderate-income families and neighborhoods.”210  Congress 
should limit the amount of affordable loans that the GSEs should 
be allowed to purchase.  For example, a cap of no more than 
twenty-five percent of the loans purchased in a year could be 
“affordable.”  This change will have likely prevent the GSEs from 
enabling another subprime crisis.  However, the change may 
likely decrease the availability of affordable loans available to 
consumers.  However, Congress has other options for supporting 
affordable housing and need not rely so heavily on the GSEs for 
affordable housing finance.  This may be for the best, as some 
commentators have even argued that GSE affordable housing 
projects represent “a new and extra constitutional way for 
Congress to dispense funds.”211   
HERA contains adequate enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
that the GSEs comply with whatever affordable housing goals 
FHFA establishes.  No additional enforcement mechanisms or 
sanctions are necessary.   
In sum, these proposed changes reflect the need for a more 
moderate approach to GSE sponsored affordable housing finance.  
The GSEs are inherently conflicted and will always be under 
pressure to engage in risky behavior in the name of increased 
shareholder returns.212  Voluntary efforts are not enough to 
 
overall loosening of underwriting guidelines, contributed to the unsustainable 
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discourage risky behavior.213  The longstanding federal goal of 
increasing home ownership is not always realistic.  “[N]o matter 
how high ownership rates [climb], there [will] always [be] a group 
below the norm that need[s] help.”214  The federal government 
can only do so much to enable homeownership before it begins 
wreaking havoc in the real estate finance system. 
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Greenspan, former Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). 
(“[T]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect 
shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.”). 
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